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Whether vertical separation of the rail industry creates demonstrable performance and 
efficiency gains is an issue of ongoing economic analysis and public policy debate.  To assist in 
consideration of the merits and disbenefits of vertical separation this paper provides a summary 
of the different studies that have been undertaken to gauge the effects of vertical separation on 
the rail industry, and analyses and codifies the main findings of this research.  The evidence 
indicates that whether separation will improve efficiency of a jurisdiction’s rail industry, and the 
extent to which this will occur, depends upon a number of specific conditions including what 
range of services are being provided – that is, passenger and/or bulk or general freight –the 
intensity of track use, and the extent to which inter-modal competition exists. The research 
highlights the merits of undertaking preliminary analysis of the characteristics of a jurisdiction’s 
rail sector before initiating structural reform of this nature. 
Keywords: Vertical integration; separation; competition, rail industry; public ownership, private 
ownership, efficiency. 
1. Introduction 
Productivity in the rail industry has been the subject of considerable investigation over an 
extended period; key studies including those by Klein (1947), Borts (1952, 1960), Meyer (1958), 
Griliches (1972), Keeler (1974); Caves and Christensen (1980); Harris (1977); Caves, Christensen 
and Swanson (1980); and Braeutigam, Daughety, and Turnquist (1984).  Dodgson (1985), Hooper 
(1987) and (Oum, Waters & Yu 1998) provide detailed summaries of this work.  An important 
policy purpose underlying much of this research was to investigate the relative efficiency of 
private versus government ownership and the relative efficiency of firms in regulated and 
unregulated environments.  In addition, some European based studies looked at the efficiency 
effects of management autonomy.  In more recent years, however, attention has turned to the 
effects on performance and productivity of the vertical disaggregation of the industry; that is the 
separation of the ownership and maintenance of the rail and associated infrastructure (signal 
equipment, marshalling yards and stations) on the one hand from the running of the trains on the 
other.   
It is possible for the rail industry to be vertically integrated – that is, infrastructure services (track, 
signals and stations) and the operation of trains incorporated into a single firm – or vertically 
disaggregated, with the infrastructure services and train operations separated.  Such separation 
enables those components of the industry with natural monopoly characteristics, the track 
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services, to be detached, thereby allowing above train operators to compete against each other in 
the delivery of freight and/or passenger services (if there is sufficient traffic density).  The track, 
signals and stations are considered more of a natural monopoly because they are durable and 
immobile and generally uneconomic to duplicate (unless density of traffic is very high).  Train 
operations do not share these characteristics, although do possess some economies of scale and 
density (Wheat & Smith 2015, 35).  Separation may take a variety of forms ranging from complete 
detachment of the provision of track infrastructure from the operation of passenger and/or 
freight trains, to putting in place third-party access arrangements so that track services may also 
be provided by an incumbent train operator.  In some cases, the latter takes place with a holding 
company owing separate entities that provide the track infrastructure and train operations.  
By creating competition amongst train operators it is hoped that higher levels of efficiency will be 
achieved; however, whether vertical separation creates demonstrable performance and efficiency 
gains is still an issue of debate.  To shed further light on the merits of vertical separation, the 
focus of this brief paper is twofold – first to provide an overview of the different studies that have 
been conducted on the effect of vertical separation on the rail industry, and secondly, and more 
importantly, to analyse and codify the key structural findings of this research in order to 
determine how important vertical separation is to improving the performance of the industry.  In 
providing this analysis the paper will provide assist policy makers on the issues surrounding rail 
industry separation.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 set out the context in which the 
issue of vertical disaggregation is to be considered.  This is done by first briefly detailing the 
theoretical bases underpinning reforms of this nature, and secondly by outlining some of the 
more recent regulatory and structural changes that have occurred in the rail industry, 
particularly those that have taken place across Europe and Australia.  The following section then 
examines the research assessing these and related reforms – first focusing on the studies 
undertaken, and then summarising the research findings.  Section 5 concludes by considering the 
policy implications of this analysis and highlighting issues that may be a focus of future research 
and examination. 
2. Theoretical drivers of vertical separation 
The primary theoretical driver for vertical separation in the rail industry is that it will enable on 
track competition.  In turn it is argued that by enabling on track competition, vertical separation 
will: 
 create incentives to reduce costs and promote innovation from increased competitive 
pressures amongst train operators; 
 lead to greater specialisation of operators and their expansion into other markets; 
 create competitive neutrality between train operators so that the most efficient survives 
and grows; and 
 create a greater degree of transparency for policy makes in the form of information on 
access pricing, track usage, etc. 
The extent of the potential benefits of vertical separation will, however, depend on the specific 
nature of the rail industry in question.  This is because the benefits of vertical separation appear 
to be higher: 
 the greater the proportion of the industry with potentially competitive elements (train 
operation).  However, rail has high fixed and sunk costs which mean the potentially 
competitive element is relatively small; 
 the greater the potential for productivity improvements;  
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 the denser the market and greater the scope for competitors to operate.  Rail has 
significant economies of density.3 The share of costs in the industry in the potentially 
competitive activities is higher in rail freight (sixty to eighty per cent freight based on the 
United States experience, but lower for passenger fifty per cent based on the United 
Kingdom experience: Gomez-Ibanez, 2003); and 
 the greater institutional capacity of the industry for regulation (Drew, 2009, p. 235). 
Moreover, while vertical separation and the introduction of competition might lead to higher 
levels of efficiency, there are also added costs associated with separation which may outweigh 
any benefits flowing from improved efficiency driven by competition.  In particular, separating 
infrastructure provision from the operation of train services results in increased costs associated 
with the need to create new mechanisms to resolve conflicts in the allocation of train paths, for 
ensuring standards are met in the rail-wheel interface and for identifying who is responsible for 
delays (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, 2005, p. 33; Merkert, 2012, p. 
13). An operator of trains, for example, cannot provide a reliable, high speed passenger service if 
the infrastructure provider does not maintain the track to a high enough standard, and/or makes 
the track infrastructure available when the services are scheduled.  As such, it is generally argued 
that for railways to operate efficiency there must be a close coordination between train operation 
and infrastructure track maintenance activities.  Maintaining or upgrading track and other 
facilities directly affects operating schedules and vice versa.  Similarly, there is often a 
technological interdependence between infrastructure and vehicle technologies (Pittman, 2005, p. 
185).  For example, investment, efficiency and safety depend to a degree on the intersection point 
between rails of the track and the wheels of the rolling stock.  Railways are often tailored to 
particular users (or with multiple users optimised for a specific user), and can vary according to 
whether they are being used for passenger, general freight or bulk freight trains.   Where there is 
vertical separation, a track infrastructure owner would be reluctant to bear the risks of 
specialised investments without long term contracts for a specific user.  By contrast a vertically 
integrated railway can coordinate operating decisions with infrastructure maintenance and 
investment decisions and can realise the full benefits of efficiency enhancing investments.  Such 
actions can be costly or impossible in open or forced access regimes (Ivaldi & McCullough, 2001, 
p. 162).  Costs are also likely to be greater where there are network capacity constraints and other 
technical constraints (Drew, 2009, p. 235).   
Indeed, there are reasons to believe that in the rail industry there exist significant economies of 
vertical integration. Further, vertical separation may actually reduce incentives to the 
infrastructure provider to maintain investment in the network.  Moreover, it may also be difficult 
to create adequate incentives with separation for investment to occur in both maintenance and 
new capacity (Australia, Bureau of Transport and Research Economics, 2003, pp. 17-18; 
Vickerman, 2004, p. 318; Buehler, Scmutzler & Benz, 2004, pp. 265-6).  There is some evidence 
internationally that vertical separation creates additional costs (Bitzan, 2003, p. 222; Ivaldi & 
McCullough, 2001, p. 180; 2004, pp. 17-18; 2008, pp. 168-9; Wetzel & Growitsch, 2006; Growitsch 
& Wetzel, 2007, pp. 20-1; 2009, p. 22; Merkert, Smith & Nash 2012, p. 363; Merkert & Nash 2013, 
pp. 23-24).  If this is so separation could only be economically justified if it was expected that 
separation would create considerable amounts of competition, which in turn would lead to 
substantial efficiency gains.   
3. Rail reform since the 1990s 
Much reform of the rail industry has been undertaken around the world since the early 1990s.  
Rail assets have been corporatized, privatised, independent train operators allowed to provide 
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services over existing track infrastructure, and in a few countries separation of the track from 
train services has been mandated.  A key driver for reform has been the view that the state-run, 
monopoly railways were inefficiently run as a consequence of poor incentive properties that 
derived from soft budget constraints, political demands for the delivery of uneconomic services 
and over-manning (Lalive & Schmultzler, 2007; Pittman, 2007).  The private railways that 
replaced them, however, often experienced difficulties. 
In Britain, where the widest reaching change occurred (and largest scale vertical disaggregation), 
when the rail system in that country was privatised in 1994 a vertically separated company, 
Railtrack was established to manage the track and associated infrastructure.  After a fatal 
accident occurred (at Hatfield) which disrupted the entire system, and after extensive criticism of 
the company’s underinvestment in physical assets, in 2002 Railtrack was bought back into quasi-
public ownership as a standalone track infrastructure owner and operator and renamed Network 
Rail (Bagwell, 2004; Pollitt & Smith, 2002; Glass, 2011; Whitehorse, 2003).  In addition, a number 
of the original on track operators of passenger franchises in Britain failed, arguably due to 
strategic or irrational bidding on the part of the operators, leading to the need to re-negotiate 
many contracts or to the temporary management of operators by government.   
Despite these problems in Britain, reform of the rail industry has been extended to the rest of 
Europe.4  The EU Directive 91/440 is the legislative instrument which provided the framework 
for the operation of the government-owned railways in the European Union.  This Directive 
required that open access to track be granted to train companies other than those that own the 
track infrastructure.  These regulatory arrangements include the cross border transit of freight.  
EU Directive 2001/14 sets out the framework for the creation of agencies that control and 
regulate the allocation of capacity to companies, and the charges for using the track.  As of 
January 2016 the fourth railway package was agreed upon by European transport ministers and 
been adopted by the European Commission but not yet been approved by the European 
Parliament. The Package covers standards and authorisation for rolling stock; workforce skills; 
independent management of infrastructure; and the liberalisation of domestic passenger services 
(European Commission, 2013). 
Subsequently nearly all European countries have separated the management of track and 
associated infrastructure from the operations of trains.  Some like Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Finland, have created fully separated train and infrastructure companies from 
their state run enterprises.  Others countries, such as Germany, have created separate subsidiaries 
for infrastructure and track operations (DB Netz) while keeping ownership under a single 
holding company.  In some other cases, separated accounting between the two organizational 
sections has occurred.  
Outside of Europe, and on a smaller scale, the Australian Rail Track Corporation was created in 
1998 to operate the Australian Government’s inter-state rail track, when the on track freight 
operator, National Rail was first separated, and then privatised.  Amongst the State and Territory 
jurisdictions in Australia, the process of reform has varied markedly.  In the State of Western 
Australia, for instance, while some commuter services are vertically integrated (i.e. in the city of 
Perth - the capital city and largest city of the State), there is mandated access to new entrants to 
the intra-state regional network (i.e. in the country regions of south-east Western Australia) and 
vertical separation on the standard gauge, inter-state network (i.e. between Perth and the eastern 
states of Australia).  In addition, there are vertically integrated, privately owned, rail lines in the 
northern parts of the state, which transport mineral ores to seaports for shipping overseas for 
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which in the past access has not been provided.5  By contrast, in the State of Victoria there are 
some commuter rail services which are vertically integrated (i.e. in the city of Melbourne - the 
capital city and largest city of the State), while others such as the country passenger services are 
vertically separated.  In addition, access to track has been provided for the intra-state regional 
network (i.e. in the country regions) whereas there has been vertical separation of the standard 
gauge, inter-state network (i.e. between Melbourne and the other states of Australia).  Similarly, 
in New South Wales from 2004 until 2013, the state government owned company, RailCorp 
provided metropolitan passenger rail services via CityRail and long distance services via 
CountryLink, while providing access to freight operators.  In 2013 the company’s operation and 
maintenance functions were transferred to Sydney Trains and NSW Trains, leaving RailCorp as 
an asset owner (see Merkert & Hensher, 2014, pp. 4-9). 
4. Vertical separation – research methodologies and findings 
While considerable reform of the rail industry has occurred over the last two decades, the 
empirical bases upon which these changes have occurred is less clear.  The purpose of this section 
is to summarise the methodologies used to assess the efficacy of reform to vertically separate the 
rail industry, and to codify the key findings of this research. 
4.1 Methodologies  
Since the early 1990s, a disparate body of research has been undertaken to assess the merits rail 
vertical integration/separation.  As illustrated in Table A1 and A2 provided in the Appendix, the 
research to date has ranged from interviews/surveys (see for instance: Merkert & Hensher, 2006; 
Merkert & Nash, 2013) and case study based analysis (see for instance: Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, 
& Crovato, 2011; Drew, 2009; Nash, Nilsson & Link 2011) to more empirically based analysis of 
productivity improvement.  In this latter cohort of studies, methodologies utilised include data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) (see for instance: Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2008, 2010; Driessen, 
Lijesen & Mulder, 2006; Growitsch & Wetzel, 2007, 2009; Wetzel & Growitsch, 2006), multi-
directional efficiency analysis (MEA) (see for instance: Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard & Kronborg, 
2009); cost functions (see for instance: Bitzan, 2003; Ivaldi & McCullough, 2001, 2004, 2008; 
Jensen, & Stelling, 2007; Mizutani & Uranishi, 2012; Mizutani, Smith, Nash & Uranishi, 2015; 
Nash, Smith, van de Velde, Mizutani & Uranishi, 2011),  stochastic production frontier (see for 
instance: Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes, 2003, 2004, 2010; Wetzel, 2008).  Most of these studies involve an 
estimation of relative efficiency across companies/countries.   For a comparison of approaches, 
see Mulder, Lijesen & Driessen (2005, pp. 16-18); Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder (2006, pp. 15-18), 
Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes (2010, pp. 78-79) and Van de Velde et. al. (2012, pp. 12-13).  
In economics, efficiency is a reference to the extent to which waste or other undesirable features 
are avoided by a producer.  Productivity, in turn, is an average measure of the efficiency of 
production.  Productivity can be expressed as the ratio of output to inputs used in the production 
process, i.e. output per unit of input.  When all outputs and inputs are included in the 
productivity measure it is called total productivity. Outputs and inputs are generally defined in 
the total productivity measure as their economic values (typical lists of outputs and inputs used 
for the rail industry productivity studies are shown in Column 3 of Table A2). The value of 
outputs minus the value of inputs is a measure of the income generated in a production process. 
It is a measure of total efficiency of a production process and as such the objective to be 
maximized in production process. 
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One method of determining levels of productivity is to construct index numbers. Broadly 
speaking, these index numbers can be used to indicate the partial or total factor productivity of 
the industry. Partial productivity measures generally relate a firm’s output to a single input 
factor. These types of measures are common in the rail industry but have shortcomings, in that 
using only a single input may be ignoring a factor that may be driving productivity growth (for a 
list of rail examples see Oum, Waters & Yu, 1998, p. 15).  Academic studies, therefore, tend to 
apply a total factor index approach or methods such as DEA or econometric estimations of 
production or cost functions. 
A total factor productivity index is the ratio of a total aggregate output quantity index to a total 
aggregate input quantity index. Total factor productivity growth, therefore, is the difference 
between the growth of the output and input quantity indices. Various different approaches can 
be used to measure total factor productivity, which can lead to different empirical results and 
interpretations.  One such approach is DEA. DEA was pioneered by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes. (1978) based on work by Farrell (1957). DEA is a linear programming technique which 
estimates organizational efficiency by measuring the ratio of total inputs employed to total 
output produced for each organization.  This ratio is then compared to others in the sample 
group to derive an estimate of relative efficiency. DEA identifies the most efficient providers of a 
good or service by their ability to produce a given level of output using the least number of 
inputs.  Other organizations in the sample group receive an efficiency score determined by the 
variance in their ratio of inputs employed to outputs produced relative to the most efficient 
producer in the sample group. DEA is therefore a measure of relative efficiency against the 
sample group’s benchmark best practice. DEA has been used extensively to assess productivity 
and efficiency levels for the rail industry as well as being used to benchmark firms against one 
another it is possible to use DEA to estimate changes in productivity of individual firms, or the 
sample as a group, over time (see for instance Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2008, 2010, 2012; 
Growitsch & Wetzel, 2007, 2009; Wetzel & Growitsch, 2006). 
Econometric methods choose either the estimation of a cost or production function. The 
estimated function can then be used to identify changes in productivity or productive efficiency. 
A number of studies have applied stochastic frontier methodologies to the rail industry. These 
have involved the estimation of both production and cost functions (in the case of the rail 
industry see for instance Bitzan, 2003; Cantos, 2001; Ivaldi & McCullough, 2001, 2004, 2008). 
Parametric techniques can be used to estimate technical efficiency by constructing first the 
production frontier derived from the best practice firms and then comparing the actual output of 
firms relative to the best practice firms (Wetzel, 2008). All of these types of studies depend upon 
the quality of the data included in these studies, and if data from different countries/companies 
is used it is important that the data is comparable.6 
Many of the studies involve the use of methods that compare the operation of different railway 
companies/systems.  This does create some difficulties in that railways are capital intensive 
multiproduct enterprises, whose outputs have a spatial dimension as well as quality attributes.  
These qualities make it difficult to undertaken any comparative productivity analysis with any 
precision.  Often there is a problem of the availability of data and cross comparisons or different 
rail systems have problems with the essential comparability of the way in which these systems 
operate.  Different rail systems, for instance, may have different shares in different types of traffic 
as well as different spatial dimensions. For these reasons making general conclusions from 
productivity studies of the rail industry is a difficult process.  There are different fundamental 
conditions in rail industry (population, geography, climate, rail industry history, railway policy, 
etc.) and existing researches are conducted in different countries (Europe, the United States 
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availability rather than expected outputs.  
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Australia and Japan). Given the problems associated with using cross comparisons it is important 
that multiple company case studies be undertaken to flesh out some of the issues.  A number to 
date have been undertaken (see for instance Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis & Crovoto, 2011; Drew, 
2009; Merkert & Hensher, 2006; Nash, Nilsson & Link, 2011). 
A range of different data has been used to capture the inputs and outputs of the industry, with 
the outputs generally being the number of freight ton and passenger kilometres and the inputs 
some indicator of capital and labour used (see Table A2).  In some cases, the unavailability of 
data or the level of aggregation can make comparisons across studies problematic.  The time 
periods observed can also be a problem, with longer term studies being better as they trend out 
short term fluctuations in results.    
The literature uses a variety of techniques and data sources, and often reaches what seem to be 
contradictory conclusions (see Table A1). Nevertheless, while a difference in results can be a 
product of the difference in methods used, it can also at times produce consistent results across 
the various methods used, which in turn can help to validate the results of studies.   
4.2 Key findings to date 
Analysis of vertical separation has focused on the range of different tasks that exist in the rail 
sector.  At the broadest level, there are passenger and freight tasks.  For passenger traffic, there 
may be either an intra-urban passenger task – that is transport within a single city – or an inter-
urban task – that is, a passenger task between population centres.  For freight, the tasks include 
high and low density bulk freight, as well as long distance low volume freight (e.g. packages and 
containers).  Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of past studies, and their results.   
The evidence of the effects of vertical separation on efficiency in passenger activity is mixed.  
Vertical separation has been associated with improved productivity in the passenger task, where 
it has been combined with horizontal separation (Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2008, pp. 27-28; 2010, 
p. 160; 2012, p. 72).  This is consistent with the related analysis incorporating both passenger and 
freight tasks, which did not find any significant impact of vertical separation on material or staff 
costs, as compared to the effect of accounting separation on both input categories (Asmild, 
Holvad, Hougaard & Kronborg, 2009, p. 633).  Further Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes (2003, p. 16; 2004, p. 
16; 2010, p. 88) found that the sequencing with which reforms are undertaken may also affect the 
extent to which the overall reforms generate efficiency benefits, as compared to where reforms 
are undertaken contemporaneously.  As might be expected the greatest gains were achieved, they 
argued, the faster and more comprehensive the manner in which reform is implemented. 
In the case of intra-urban passenger rail this task involves intensive use of infrastructure, 
primarily because it involves multiple train movements over relatively short distances.  In 
addition, high safety standards are generally required, because it involves movements of people 
(as compared goods), and because these movements generally occur through densely populated 
environments in which the rail network is integrated with a broader transport system.  Together, 
these factors mean the cost of separation will generally be high, and as a consequence are 
unlikely to be offset by any potential benefits that would arise from greater competition.  For this 
reason, introduction of competition in the intra-urban passenger market appears to have 
occurred primarily through the implementation of franchising arrangements in the passenger 
sector to improve efficiency, with franchises preferring to operate on track they control.  Studies 
by researchers such as Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, and Crovato (2011, p. 13), Cantos (2001, p. 83), 
and Wetzel (2008, p. 27) all found that separation in freight to provide far more scope for 
efficiency gains that urban passenger services.  In addition, Mizutani, Smith, Nash and Uranshi 
(2015, pp. 56-57) and Nash, Smith, van de Velde,, Mizutani & Uranishi, (2014) found that the 
optimal structure depended on the density and type of traffic.  They found that vertical 
separation increased costs if networks were intensely used, which supports the previous made 
contention that in densely populated environments the costs of separation can be high.  In the 
case of inter-urban passenger services there are similar concerns regarding safety, management  
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Table 1. Summary of the results of the studies on rail vertical integration (separation) 
AUTHORS RESULTS 
Affuso & Newbery 2002 Vertical separation and competition created greater incentives for companies to invest 
Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard 
& Kronborg 2009 
Accounting separation improved TE. Complete separation not significant. 
Bitzan 2003 Economies associated with vertically integrated railway maintenance and transport 
Cantos 2001 Costs from freight & infrastructure are complementary and for passenger & 
infrastructure substitutes. Investment in infrastructure needs to closely meet needs of 
freight. 
Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 
2008, 2010 
Efficiency gains from horizontal & vertical separation. The former more important, both 
by itself and helping vertical separation 
Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 
2012 
Efficiency gains from horizontal & vertical separation. The former more important, both 
by itself and helping vertical separation. vertical separation by itself did not improve 
efficiency 
Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, & 
Crovato 2011 
Greatest benefits from separation of freight rather than passenger. Depends on degree 
of  competition introduced. Full separation with competition is the best. 
Drew 2009 Separation benefits freight customers more than open access does. 
Drew & Nash 2011 No correlation between vertical separation and the growth in rail freight traffic or rail‘s 
share of total freight traffic 
Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder 
2006 
Access lowers productive efficiency, tendering improves productive efficiency; 
ambiguous results for vertical separation,  
Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes 
2003, 2004, 2010 
Full implementation improves efficiency; sequencing important 
Growitsch & Wetzel 2007, 
2009 
Integrated firms relatively more efficient (70% of companies had economies of scope) 
Ivaldi & McCullough 2001 Most cost complementarities between general freight & maintenance but not between 
bulk & intermodal and track maintenance. 
Ivaldi & McCullough 2004, 
2008 
Vertical & horizontal economies of scope (20-40 % loss productivity efficiency from 
vertical & 70 horizontal) 
Jensen & Stelling 2007 Vertical separation raises costs, competition lowers cost, overall improvement in cost 
efficiency 
Merkert 2012 Transaction costs with separated companies can be up to 10% of operating costs (less 
with access to vertically integrated company) 
Merkert & Hensher 2014 High asset specificity tends to raise costs with access 
Merkert & Nash 2013 Interactions between train operators and infrastructure managers are frequent, complex 
and intense, particularly in the areas of slot allocation/timetabling and day-to-day 
operations 
Mizutani & Shoji 2004 No impact of vertical separation versus integration for cost of operating & maintaining 
infrastructure 
Mizutani & Uranishi 2012 Separation reduces costs with low density, and raises costs with high density 
Mizutani, Smith, Nash & 
Uranishi 2015 
Optimal structure depends on the density and type of traffic. Vertical separation 
increases costs on intensely used networks and reduces them on lightly used ones. 
Mulder, Lijesen & Driessen 
2005 
Success of vertical separation depends on degree of new competition introduced  
Nash, Nilsson & Link 2011 No discernible difference between open access & complete separation 
Nash, Smith, van de Velde,, 
Mizutani & Uranishi, 2014 
Found that costs were higher on separated track where traffic was dense and freight 
proportions high. 
Rivera-Trujillo 2004 Found that competition increases efficiency, but that vertical separation reduces it. 
However, if vertical separation is necessary for introducing competition, he concluded 
that its overall effect may be to increase efficiency 
Van de Velde, Nash, Smith, 
Mizutani, Uranishi, Lijesen, 
Zschoche 2012 
Vertical separation has little affect when density average, at high density it increases 
costs, at low density it reduces them 
Wetzel 2008 Access increases productive efficiency for freight, but reduces it for passenger services; 
vertical separation results are ambiguous 
Wetzel & Growitsch 2006 Integrated firms relatively more efficient (70% of companies had economies of scope) 
EJTIR 17(2), 2017, pp.207-224  215 
Abbott and Cohen 




and investment requirements.  Generally, if management and scheduling costs are high, as are 
safety requirements, it can be difficult to make many gains from vertical separation.   
On a broader level, analysis also indicates that the benefits of separation are greater in freight 
than in relation to the passenger task – in part because passenger operations are usually highly 
dependent on public funding and the opportunities for purely commercial operations tend to be 
more limited (Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, & Crovato, 2011, pp. 13-14).   
Generally, the freight task is associated with the greater possibility that either vertical separation 
or alternatively third-party track access arrangements (or holding company arrangements) will 
result in competition benefits and therefore greater efficiency (Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, & 
Crovato, 2011, p. 13; Drew, 2009, pp. 23-5; Wetzel, 2008, p. 28).  However, this finding is far from 
uniform. 
On the one hand, a substantive body of evidence suggests efficiency is enhanced where full 
separation and substantial competition is introduced (i.e. full reform) (Affuso & Newbery, 2002, 
p. 83; Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2008, pp. 27-28; 2012, p. 72; Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis & Crovato, 
2011, p. 13; Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes, 2003, p. 17; 2010, p. 89; Jensen & Stelling, 2007, p. 533; Merkert, 
Smith & Nash, 2012, p. 363).  In part, these potential gains depend on the scope for competitive 
entry and size of the original inefficiency of the rail industry. In such circumstances vertical 
separation, if it promotes substantial enough competition, might result in improved efficiency 
(Mulder, Lijesen & Driessen. 2005, p. 30; Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2012, p. 72).  By contrast, if 
vertical separation is not also associated with horizontal separation, the potential efficiency and 
productivity benefits can be far more limited (Cantos, Pastor & Serrano, 2008, p. 28).   
There is also a body of literature that suggests vertical separation is either not important at 
improving efficiency (perhaps unless there is strong competition as well) (Asmild, Holvad, 
Hougaard & Kronberg, 2009, p. 633; Rivera-Trujillo, 2004) or may even have a negative effect.  
Bitzan (2003, p. 301), for example, found first that there are economies associated with vertically 
integrated, transport and maintenance, which in turn suggested that separation increases costs.  
He also posited that as rail is a natural monopoly that multi-firm competition would increase 
resource costs.   
Separately, if there is strong competition between a vertically integrated railway with other 
railways and with other forms of transport (which results in high levels of efficiency) then 
separation is unlikely to bring about additional gains in efficiency.  The greater this level of 
activity, the more likely separation costs will be greater than potential gains.  This would explain 
the results of the studies in the United States freight industry, which envisage little to be gained 
from separation (Bitzan, 2003, 201; Ivaldi & McCullough, 2004, pp. 17-18; 2008, pp. 168-9).7  In the 
case of a number of European studies, the reform and separation may have been able to bring 
about improvements in productivity, simply because so many of the national rail industries were 
starting from levels of low productivity. 
A similar result was found by Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder (2006, pp. 35-6) in respect of third party 
access rights.  This study also showed a negative influence of providing managers with greater 
independence from government on productive efficiency.  It was posited that this result may 
relate to the predominance of state ownership amongst the industries being assessed – the 
suggestion being that independence in the absence of competition could result in lower 
productivity.  More broadly, however, such results conflict with some other studies and they 
suggest the difference might be the result of differences in data, different variable definitions and 
estimation methodologies used (Drew & Nash, 2001, p. 4; Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder, 2006, pp. 
35-6).   
                                                          
7 It should be noted that the studies on the United States industry are on vertically integrated companies, which 
might affect the results by not providing a comparison of separated to integrated companies.   
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The extent to which freight benefits from separation, therefore, depends also on the 
characteristics of both the freight task and infrastructure in question.  High frequency of traffic in 
bulk freight mean there must be a high coordination between operation and maintenance.  This 
creates higher coordination issues if separation takes place.  For major bulk carriers there might 
be significant savings from closely coordinating the design of track and rolling stock.  Often, 
therefore, track is tailored to specific bulk users (Van de Velde et al., 2012, p. 27).  This is 
particularly true if the track is not used for other purposes such as passenger or container freight 
traffic.  A high degree of asset specificity means a higher degree of access costs (Merkert & 
Hensher, 2014, p. 11; Cantos, 2001, p. 83).  Vertical separation can also increase costs on densely 
used networks because of the increased likelihood of poor decisions and increased costs of 
misalignment (McNulty, 2011, p. 8; Ivaldi & McCullough, 2001, p. 180; Mizutani & Uranishi, 
2012, p. 57; Mizutani, Smith, Nash & Uranishi, 2014, pp. 511-512; Van de Velde et al., 2012, p. 11). 
By contrast, in the case of low density, long distance freight a supplier of track access is less 
vulnerable and more likely to invest if the infrastructure can be designed for use by many 
customers rather than have to be designed to the needs of a single one (Mizutani & Uranishi, 
2012, p. 57; Van de Velde et al., 2012, p. 11).  In these circumstances there may be advantages 
from separation if it promotes competition, and in turn higher levels of efficiency.  For low 
density bulk traffic, such as grains in transport-related isolated regions, the results might also be 
different from heavy freight.  To date, however, little research has been undertaken on the case of 
low density, long distance freight (Mizutani & Uranishi, 2012, p. 42).).  Further research on the 
impact of separation on this type of freight task could give greater clarity to the possible benefits 
of separation. 
          5. Summary and conclusions 
In many countries policy makers and railway authorities have been debating the various pros 
and cons of vertical separation in order to determine if reform of that nature is a viable means of 
improving the performance of their rail sectors.  Despite the various structural and ownership 
reforms that have occurred in the rail sector around the world, no clear model for achieving this 
objective of enhanced competition and efficiency has yet been found (Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation Development, 2005, p. 61).   
This situation is driven by the often dissimilar conditions faced by the rail industries of different 
countries, which can change the levels of costs and benefits of vertically disaggregation.  The 
physical conditions of the rail industry are not uniform across all regions.  Further, rail services of 
different type and location face dissimilar levels of competition from other transport modes.  The 
extent of this competition to rail is driven by a range of factors, including the geographic, 
demographic and economic aspects of the different regions and countries in which the rail 
industry is situated.  Further, these factors may impact differently depending on the type of 
services being provided by the rail industry.  
Given this variety of circumstances it is possible for different structural arrangements to apply to 
different parts of the infrastructure and for different services, and for reform to these 
arrangements to have differing economic effects.  For policy makers, a key insight is that  
separation is likely to be more successful in some parts of the industry compared to others 
(Pittman, 2005, p. 181).  This helps to explain why the studies on the impact of separation can 
appear conflicting. Often the studies compare different systems, with different densities, 
operating conditions and different levels of efficiency before reform and so can be the source of 
the different results. 
The circumstances in urban passenger services, with high safety standards, often dense traffic 
with high coordination costs, a high specificity of assets, substantial management and 
coordination costs and often government subsidy means that separation can be potentially very 
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costly. This situation might also be true with inter-urban traffic, although more research on this 
type of traffic would be useful.   
Circumstances in rail freight appear somewhat different. On the one hand, the circumstances in 
some freight markets, such as low density, long distance freight, generally appear to be quite 
different from those operating in the passenger market.  In this section of the rail industry, 
separation, and the introduction of competition, could generally be expected to lead to efficiency 
gains without too much increase in the costs of coordination (although the research suggests that 
this will depend upon how much inter-modal competition has been separately driving higher 
levels of efficiency). On the other hand, in the case of high density, bulk freight the results of 
studies are generally mixed, with some finding that separation can improve levels of competition 
and efficiency, and others that it leads to substantial increased costs.  One possible reason for 
these mixed results is the original conditions that exist in the jurisdictions that have been studied.  
For instance, if there is a high degree of competition (both inter-modal and inter-rail) before 
separation takes place then it is unlikely that separation will result in much gain in terms of 
efficiency. In the United States, for instance, most freight markets are very competitive with 
competition between railways and with road transport being especially strong.  Separation in 
these circumstances would be unlikely to gain much in terms of improved efficiency.  If the 
industry on the other hand is characterised before separation by the existence of large, inefficient, 
possibly government-owned, companies, then the introduction of a combination of competition 
and separation can lead to substantial efficiency gains. This perhaps explains why studies that 
include a number of European railways show efficiency gains from the reform process.  
Nevertheless, the evidence to date of reform in this area is not conclusive.  Additional research 
that focuses on the costs and benefits of separation in this segment of the market is needed, 
particularly case studies of individual companies or systems, which have been through a process 
of reform and separation. For policy makers, this also suggests that there is considerable merit in 
undertaking preliminary analysis of the characteristics of a jurisdiction’s rail sector before 
initiating structural reform of this nature. 
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Table A1. Summary of studies on rail vertical integration – methodologies and data used 
(separation) 
AUTHORS DATA USED METHOD 
Affuso & Newbery 2002 UK; 1995-97 to 2000; passenger; 25 companies Investment function 
Asmild, Holvad, Hougaard 
& Kronborg 2009 
Europe; 1995-2001; passenger & freight; 25 countries MEA & 2nd stage regression 
Bitzan 2003 US; 1983-97; freight; 30 companies Translog quasi-cost function 
Cantos 2001 Europe; 1973-90; passenger & freight; 12 companies Translog cost function 
Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 
2008, 2010 
Europe; 1985-2000, passenger & freight; 16 countries DEA & 2nd stage regression 
Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 
2012 
Europe; 2001-2008, passenger & freight; 23 countries DEA & 2nd stage regression 
Dionori, Dunmore, Ellis, & 
Crovato 2011 
Europe; passenger & freight. 5 countries Case study 
Drew 2009 Germany/Sweden/UK; 1997-2005; freight; 3 
countries 
Case study 
Drew & Nash 2011 Europe; 1998-2008; passenger & freight; 16 countries Index comparison of markets 
Driessen, Lijesen & Mulder 
2006 
World; 1990-2001; passenger and freight; 52 countries DEA & 2nd stage regression 
Friebel, Ivaldi & Vibes 
2003, 2004, 2010 
Europe; 1980-2003; passenger & freight; 11 countries Stochastic production frontier 
Growitsch & Wetzel 2007, 
2009 
Europe; 2000-2004; passenger & freight; 54 firms DEA 
Ivaldi & McCullough 2001 US ; 1978-1997; freight; 25 companies Estimate multiproduct  cost 
function 
Ivaldi & McCullough 2004, 
2008 
US; 1978-2001; freight Generalized McFadden cost 
function 
Jensen & Stelling 2007 Sweden; 1970-1999; passenger & freight Estimate cost function 
Merkert 2012 Germany/Sweden/UK; 46 companies Estimation of transaction costs 
Merkert & Hensher 2006 Australia; freight; 45 managers Survey 
Merkert & Nash 2013 Germany/Sweden/UK; 2008, 2012/13; passenger & 
freight ;81 managers  
Interviews 
Merkert, Smith & Nash 
2012 
Germany/Sweden/UK; 3 countries a bottom-up approach to compute 
transaction costs between train 
operation and infrastructure 
Mizutani & Shoji 2004 Japan; 1 company Case study 
Mizutani & Uranishi 2012 Europe & East Asia; 1994-2007; passenger & freight; 
30 companies  
Cost function 
Mizutani, Smith, Nash & 
Uranishi 2015 
Europe & East Asia; 1994-2010 
Passenger & freight: 33 companies 
Cost function 
Mulder, Lijesen & Driessen 
2005 
Netherlands; 1998-2004; passenger & freight Cost benefit case study 
Nash, Nilsson & Link 2011 Germany/Sweden/UK; passenger & freight; 3 
countries 
Case study 
Nash, Smith, van de Velde,, 
Mizutani & Uranishi, 2014 
Europe, 1997-2010; passenger & freight Cost function 
Rivera-Trujillo 2004 Europe; passenger & freight  
Van der Velde, Nash, 
Smith, Mizutani, Uranishi, 
Lijesen, Zschoche 2012 
Europe & Japan; passenger & freight. 27 countries Cost function 
Wetzel 2008 Europe; 1994-2005; passenger & freight; 31 
companies/22 countries 
Stochastic production frontier 
Wetzel & Growitsch 2006 Europe; 2000-2004; passenger & freight; 54 firms DEA 
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Investment in new rolling 
stock 
Contract characteristics (length of the contract, request of renegotiation, 
award of extension, asset specificity);  
Proxy market conditions (demand, variance of demand; future state of 
competition); 
Firm characteristics (initial state of rolling stock, level of profits; 




Passenger train kilometres 
Freight train kilometres  
Staff costs 
Material purchases and external charges 
Network length 
Reform characteristics (accounting separation; complete separation; 
independent management; competitive tendering for passenger 
services; market opening freight transport) 
Bitzan 2003 Cost excluding way and 
structure costs 
Prices of labour; materials and supplies; fuel; equipment 
Adjusted unit train gross ton-miles; way train gross ton-miles; through 
train gross ton-miles 
Route miles 
Average length of haul 
Miles of track per mile of road 
Net investment in way and structures per mile of track 




Value of ways and fixed installations 
Track length 
Labour costs 
Energy and fuel costs 
Materials and external services  
Cantos, Pastor & 
Serrano 2008, 
2010 




Number of employees in all the railway systems 
A representative measure of the passenger train supply calculated as 
the number of coaches, railcars and multiple unit trailers available for 
passenger transport 
A representative measure of freight train supply calculated as the 
annual fleet wagons strength for freight transport 
Number of kilometre of railway infrastructure 
Reform characteristics (e.g. vertical separation, horizontal separation 
and combined reforms) 
Derived variables using original variables above 
Cantos, Pastor & 
Serrano 2012 
As per Cantos, Pastor & 
Serrano 2008, 2010 
As per Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 2008, 2010 save that reform 
characteristics include specific variables for introduction of new freight 






Input of labour 
Tracks 
Input of capital 
Control variables (Total area; GDP per capita; Population density; 
Traffic structure; Traffic Density) 




Freight ton kilometres 
Labour 
Capital 
Reform characteristics (vertical separation; third party access; 










Organisation type (integrated firms; infrastructure managers; 




Car miles of bulk traffic 
Car miles of high value 
traffic 
Car miles of general traffic 
Replacement ties installed in a given year 
Indices of labour prices; equipment prices; fuel prices; material prices 
and other input prices 
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Car miles of bulk traffic 
Car miles of high value 
traffic 
Car miles of general traffic 
Replacement ties installed in a given year 
Indices of labour prices; equipment prices; fuel prices; material prices 
and other input prices 
Miles of road operated 




Freight ton kilometres 
Total cost 
Reform characteristics (vertical separation; competition) 
Environmental characteristics (technological development; intermodal 




Freight ton kilometres 
Labour cost per employee 
Energy price per 1000 TOE 
Material costs per rolling stock 
Capital cost per route length 
Total route kilometres 
Percentage of electrified line 
Share of passenger revenue to total revenue 
Passenger per train to capacity 
Revenue passenger kilometre per passenger 
Number of freight car per train 
Train kilometre per route length per day 





Freight to kilometres 
Labour cost per employee 
Energy price per 1000 TOE 
Material costs per rolling stock 
Capital cost per route length 
Total route kilometres 
Percentage of electrified line 
Share of passenger revenue to total revenue 
Passenger per train to capacity 
Revenue passenger kilometre per passenger 
Number of freight car per train 
Train kilometre per route length per day 
Reform characteristics (vertical separation; holding company, 
horizontal separation) 







Freight ton kilometres 
Route length 





Reform characteristics (vertical separation; holding company; 
passenger competition; freight competition) 
Wetzel 2008 Passenger kilometres 
Freight ton kilometres 
Number of employees  
Number of rolling stock 
Network length 











Organisation type (integrated firms; infrastructure managers; 
passenger operators; freight operators) 
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